///(^ 


/ 


SYNOPSIS 


of  the 


Geneva  Protocol 


for  the 


Pacific  Settlement 

of 

International  Disputes 


What  It  Is 

What  It  Means  to  World  Peace 
What  It  Means  to  America 


Published  by 

The  League  of  Nations  Non-Partisan  Association 
6 East  39th  Street,  New  York,  N.  Y. 


1 


The  text  of  the  Geneva  Protocol  as  re- 
printed herewith  was  approved  by  the 
Fifth  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations 
and  opened  for  Signature  at  Geneva  on 
October  2,  1924. 


The  synopsis  of  the  Protocol  was  prepared 
by  Dr.  Manley  O.  Hudson,  Bemis  Pro- 
fessor of  International  Law,  Harvard 
University. 


INTRODUCTION 


The  Protocol  of  Geneva  is  a treaty  to  outlaw  war.  That 
phrase  now  gains  new  significance.  It  is  no  longer  merely 
a matter  of  public  discussion,  but  has  become  a practical 
procedure  for  making  war  an  international  crime. 

The  Protocol  fills  in  gaps  in  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations.  Its  framers  desire  that  all  war  in  the  future  should  be 
outside  the  pale  of  law,  just  as,  during  the  past  few  centuries, 
fighting  between  individuals  has  been  put  outside  the  pale  of 
law.  If  their  methods  should  prove  successful,  fighting  could 
lawfully  be  undertaken  in  the  future  only  to  defend  the  com- 
mon interests  of  all  nations  against  attack. 

It  may  not  be  necessary  for  all  nations  to  follow  exactly  the  same 
course.  What  proves  satisfactory  for  one  continent  may  not 
prove  satisfactory  for  another.  In  North  America,  we  have  long 
had  an  agreement  with  Canada  for  border  disarmament.  Per- 
haps the  same  kind  of  an  agreement  would  not  work  in  another 
part  of  the  world,  where  conditions  are  different.  In  the  Western 
hemisphere,  we  have  long  had  the  Pan-American  Union.  Perhaps 
this  same  method  of  international  organization  would  not  be  sat- 
isfactory in  another  continent. 

But  it  is  a significant  fact  that  forty-eight  nations  have  joined 
in  framing  the  Protocol  for  the  Pacific  Settlement  of  International 
Disputes  and  that  eleven  European  nations  have  already  signed 
it  in  an  attempt  as  among  themselves  to  establish  a procedure 
which  will  meet  their  own  ideas  of  security.  Other  nations  will 
undoubtedly  take  part.  The  nations  of  North  America  can  hardly 
fail  to  welcome  an  event  so  important,  so  fraught  with  possibil- 
ities for  the  peace  of  the  future. 

There  is  no  question  today  of  the  United  States  signing  the 
Protocol.  But  there  is  a question  of  how  we  are  to  greet  a serious 
effort  made  by  other  nations  to  meet  in  their  own  way  the  problem 
of  establishing  a secure  peace.  If  they  succeed  in  doing  this,  how- 
ever, there  will  also  be  the  question  of  American  participation  in 
a World  Conference  on  Disarmament.  We  should  see  to  it  that 
our  country  does  not  fail  to  participate  in  this ; for  this  is  some- 
thing which  does  not  involve  us  in  any  of  the  commitments  which 
members  of  the  League  take  upon  themselves.  In  such  a confer- 
ence we  should  be  quite  free  to  decide  for  ourselves  how  far  we 
may  go  in  this  direction. 


3 


TEXT  OF  THE  PROTOCOL* 

PREAMBLE 

Animated  by  the  firm  desire  to  ensure  the  maintenance  of 
general  peace  and  the  security  of  nations  whose  existence,  inde- 
pendence or  territories  may  be  threatened ; 

Recognizing  the  solidarity  of  the  members  of  the  interna- 
tional community ; 

Asserting  that  a war  of  aggression  constitutes  a violation  of 
this  solidarity  and  an  international  crime ; 


Desirous  of  facilitating  the  complete  application  of  the  sys- 
tem provided  in  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  for  the 
pacific  settlement  of  disputes  between  States  and  of  ensuring  the 
repression  of  international  crimes;  and 


For  the  purpose  of  realizing,  as  contemplated  by  Article  8 
of  the  Covenant,  the  reduction  of  national  armaments  to  the  low- 
est point  consistent  with  national  safety  and  the  enforcement  by 
common  action  of  international  obligations ; 


* Reprinted  from  the  ofticial  Document.  The  French  and  English  texts  are  both 
authentic. 


4 


Comment  on  Preamble,  par.  3. 

This  declaration  that  aggressive  war  is  an  international 
crime  is  made  for  the  first  time  in  history.  It  is  a realization 
of  the  American  movement  to  outlaw  war,  in  which  Senator 
Borah,  Professor  John  Dewey,  of  Columbia  University  and 
Mr.  Salmon  O.  Levinson,  a Chicago  lawyer,  have  been  active. 
Senator  Borah  introduced  a resolution  in  the  Senate  on 
February  13,  1923,  that  war  should  be  made  a “public  crime 
under  the  law  of  nations.”  This  has  now  been  done  by  the 
Protocol. 


Comment  on  Preamble,  par.  4. 

The  Protocol  is  a separate  treaty.  It  does  not  supersede 
or  amend  the  Covenant.  Rather,  it  supplements  the  covenant 
just  as  the  Protocol  establishing  the  World  Court  supplements 
it,  and  provides  for  actually  doing  what  members  of  the 
League  had  already  agreed  to  do. 


Comment  on  Preamble,  par.  5. 

The  League  has  had  a special  committee,  called  the  Tem- 
porary Mixed  Commission  for  the  Reduction  of  Armaments, 
at  work  for  four  years.  Its  efforts  have  shown  that  dis- 
armament depends  on  security,  and  that  security  depends  on 
arbitration.  Hence  the  Protocol  links  the  three  things — 
arbitration,  security,  disarmament. 

5 


The  Undersigned,  duly  authorized  to  that  effect,  agree  as 
follows : 

Article  1. 

The  signatory  States  undertake  to  make  every  effort  in  their 
power  to  secure  the  introduction  into  the  Covenant  of  amend- 
ments on  the  lines  of  the  provisions  contained  in  the  following 
articles. 

They  agree  that,  as  between  themselves,  these  provisions  shall 
be  binding  as  from  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present  Protocol 
and  that,  so  far  as  they  are  concerned,  the  Assembly  and  the 
Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  shall  thenceforth  have  power  to 
exercise  all  the  rights  and  perform  all  the  duties  conferred  upon 
them  by  the  Protocol. 

« 

Article  2. 

The  signatory  States  agree  in  no  case  to  resort  to  war  either 
with  one  another  or  against  a State  which,  if  the  occasion  arises, 
accepts  all  the  obligations  hereinafter  set  out,  except  in  case  of 
resistance  to  acts  of  aggression  or  when  acting  in  agreement  with 
the  Council  or  the  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations  in  accord- 
ance with  the  provisions  of  the  Covenant  and  of  the  present 
Protocol. 

Article  3. 

The  signatory  States  undertake  to  recognize  as  compulsory, 
ipso  facto  and  without  special  agreement,  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice  in  the  cases  covered  by 
paragraph  2 of  Article  36  of  the  Statute  of  the  Court,  but  with- 
out prejudice  to  the  right  of  any  State,  when  acceding  to  the 
special  protocol  provided  for  in  the  said  Article  and  opened  for 
signature  on  December  16th,  1920,  to  make  reservations  com- 
patible with  the  said  clause. 

Accession  to  this  special  protocol,  opened  for  signature  on 
December  16th,  1920,  must  be  given  within  the  month  following 
the  coming  into  force  of  the  present  Protocol. 

States  which  accede  to  the  present  Protocol,  after  its  coming 


6 


'Comment  on  Article  3. 

This  binds  the  signatories  to  accept,  within  one  month 
after  the  Protocol  conies  into  force,  the  compulsory  jurisdic- 
tion over  legal  disputes  of  the  Permanent  Court  of  Inter- 
national Justice.  Such  jurisdiction  applies  in  the  following 
cases  (Art.  36  of  the  Court  Statute)  : 

1)  Interpretation  of  a treaty. 

2)  Any  question  of  international  law. 

3)  Determination  of  breach  of  any  international 
obligation. 

4)  Reparation  for  such  a breach. 

7 


into  force,  must  carry  out  the  above  obligation  -within  the  month 
following  their  accession. 


Article  4. 

With  a view  to  render  more  complete  the  provisions  of  para- 
graphs 4,  5,  6,  and  7 of  Article  15  of  the  Covenant,  the  signatory 
States  agree  to  comply  with  the  following  procedure: 


1.  If  the  dispute  submitted  to  the  Council  is  not  settled  by 
it  as  provided  in  paragraph  3 of  the  said  Article  15,  the 
Council  shall  endeavor  to  persuade  the  parties  to  submit 
the  dispute  to  judicial  settlement  or  arbitration. 

2.  (a)  If  the  parties  cannot  agree  to  do  so,  there  shall,  at 
the  request  of  at  least  one  of  the  parties,  be  constituted 
a Committee  of  Arbitrators.  The  Committee  shall  so  far 
as  possible  be  constituted  by  agreement  between  the 
parties. 

(&)  If  within  the  period  fixed  by  the  Council  the 
parties  have  failed  to  agree,  in  whole  or  in  part,  upon  the 
number,  the  names  and  the  powers  of  the  arbitrators  and 


8 


Twenty-one  states  have  already  accepted  this  jurisdic- 
tion. These  include:  Austria,  Brazil,  Bulgaria,  China, 
Costa  Rica,  Denmark,  Esthonia,  Finland,  Haiti,  Latvia, 
Liberia,  Lithuania,  Luxemburg,  Netherlands,  Norway, 
Panama,  Portugal,  Salvador,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  Uruguay. 
France  has  now  accepted  it  also,  for  M.  Briand  signed  the 
so-called  “optional  clause”  of  the  Court  Statute  the  day  he 
signed  the  Protocol.  A state  may  make  reservations  in 
accepting  the  optional  clause.  Thus,  Mr.  Arthur  Henderson 
announced  that  Great  Britain  had  in  mind  a reservation  that 
the  clause  would  not  apply  to  any  question  arising  out  of  the 
use  of  the  British  fleet  in  defense  of  the  Covenant  with  the 
approval  of  the  League. 

Comment  on  Article  4,  unnumbered  par.  1. 

This  is  an  attempt  to  fill  out  the  gap  in  Article  15  of 
the  Covenant  and  to  make  its  application  more  simple. 

Under  Articles  12  and  13  of  the  Covenant  a state  may 
submit  a dispute  either  to  arbitration  or  inquiry  by  the  Coun- 
cil. If  it  chooses  the  latter  course,  then  the  Protocol  here 
outlines  what  the  Council  will  do.  It  will : 

Comment  on  Article  4,  par.  1. 

1)  Try  to  settle  the  dispute. 

2)  Failing  (1),  try  to  persuade  the  disputants  to 
arbitrate. 

Comment  on  Article  4,  par.  2 (a). 

3)  Failing  (1)  and  (2),  if  one  disputant  requests,  set 
up  an  Arbitration  Committee. 


Comment  on  par.  2 (b). 

Special  provision  is  made  for  selecting  the  members  of 
this  arbitration  committee. 


9 


upon  the  procedure,  the  Council  shall  settle  the  points 
remaining  in  suspense.  It  shall  with  the  utmost  possible 
despatch  select  in  consultation  with  the  parties  the  arbi- 
trators and  their  President  from  among  persons  who  by 
their  nationality,  their  personal  character  and  their  experi- 
ence, appear  to  it  to  furnish  the  highest  guarantees  of 
competence  and  impartiality. 

(c)  After  the  claims  of  the  parties  have  been 
formulated,  the  Committee  of  Arbitrators,  on  the  request 
of  any  party,  shall  through  the  medium  of  the  Council 
request  advisory  opinion  upon  any  points  of  law  in  dis- 
pute from  the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice, 
which  in  such  case  shall  meet  with  the  utmost  possible 
despatch. 

3.  If  none  of  the  parties  asks  for  arbitration,  the  Council 
shall  again  take  the  dispute  under  consideration.  If  the 
Council  reaches  a report  which  is  unanimously  agreed  to 
by  the  members  thereof  other  than  the  representatives  of 
any  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  the  signatory  States 
agree  to  comply  with  the  recommendations  therein. 

4.  If  the  Council  fails  to  reach  a report  which  is  concurred 
in  by  all  its  members,  other  than  the  representatives  of 
any  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  it  shall  submit  the  dis- 
pute to  arbitration.  It  shall  itself  determine  the  composi- 
tion, the  powers  and  the  procedure  of  the  Committee  of 
Arbitrators  and,  in  the  choice  of  the  arbitrators,  shall  bear 
in  mind  the  guarantees  of  competence  and  impartiality 
referred  to  in  paragraph  2 (b)  above. 

5.  In  no  case  may  a solution,  upon  which  there  has  already 
been  a unanimous  recommendation  of  the  Council  ac- 
cepted by  one  of  the  parties  concerned,  be  again  called 
in  question. 


10 


Comment  on  par.  2 (c). 

The  arbitration  committee  may  also  seek  through  the 
Council  the  advisory  opinion  of  the  Permanent  Court  of 
International  Justice  on  legal  points. 


Comment  on  par.  3. 

4)  Failing  (1),  (2)  and  (3),  if  an  arbitration  is  not 
requested  the  Council  will  endeavor  to  reach  a unani- 
mous agreement  on  a report,  and  if  such  agreement 
is  reached  it  will  be  binding. 


Comment  on  par.  4. 

5)  Failing  (1),  (2),  (3)  and  (4),  the  Council  itself 
will  submit  the  dispute  to  arbitration  and  determine 
the  conditions  of  the  arbitration, 


11 


6.  The  signatory  States  undertake  that  they  will  carry  out 
in  full  good  faith  any  judicial  sentence  or  arbitral  award 
that  may  be  rendered  and  that  they  will  comply,  as  pro- 
vided in  paragraph  3 above,  with  the  solutions  recom- 
mended by  the  Council.  In  the  event  of  a State  failing  to 
carry  out  the  above  undertakings,  the  Council  shall  exert 
all  its  influence  to  secure  compliance  therewith.  If  it  fails 
therein,  it  shall  propose  what  steps  should  be  taken  to  give 
effect  thereto,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  contained 
at  the  end  of  Article  13  of  the  Covenant.  Should  a State 
in  disregard  of  the  above  undertakings  resort  to  war,  the 
sanctions  provided  for  by  Article  16  of  the  Covenant,  in- 
terpreted in  the  manner  indicated  in  the  present  Protocol, 
shall  immediately  become  applicable  to  it. 

7.  The  provisions  of  the  present  article  do  not  apply  to  the 
'settlement  of  disputes  which  arise  as  the  result  of  meas- 
ures of  war  taken  by  one  or  more  signatory  States  in 
agreement  with  the  Council  or  the  Assembly. 

Article  5. 

The  provisions  of  paragraph  8 of  Article  15  of  the  Cove- 
nant shall  continue  to  apply  in  proceedings  before  the  Council. 


If  in  the  course  of  an  arbitration,  such  as  is  contemplated  in 
Article  4 above,  one  of  the  parties  claims  that  the  dispute,  or  part 
thereof,  arises  out  of  a matter  which  by  international  law  is  solely 
within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  that  party,  the  arbitrators  shall 
on  this  point  take  the  advice  of  the  Permanent  Court  of  Interna- 

12 


Comment  on  par.  6. 

At  any  of  these  stages  a judgment  of  the  Permanent 
Court  of  International  Justice  or  an  award  of  the  arbitrators, 
or  a unanimous  recommendation  of  the  Council  must  be 
followed  by  the  disputants,  and  if  a state  refuses  to  follow, 
the  Council  will  exert  its  influence  to  induce  the  state  to 
accept.  If  in  disregard  of  this  undertaking,  a state  goes  to 
war,  it  will  become  an  aggressor. 


Comment  on  Article  5,  par.  1. 

The  Covenant  provides  in  Article  15,  par.  8,  as  follows: 

“If  the  dispute  between  the  parties  is  claimed  by 
one  of  them,  and  is  found  by  the  Council,  to  arise 
out  of  a matter  which  by  international  law  is  solely 
within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  that  party,  the  Coun- 
cil shall  so  report,  and  shall  make  no  recommendation 
as  to  its  settlement.” 

This  paragraph  continues  to  have  force. 


Comment  on  Article  5,  par.  2. 

This  only  applies  to  a contention  that  a dispute  relates 
to  a domestic  matter  arising  in  the  course  of  an  arbitration. 
If  the  Court  upholds  such  a contention,  the  arbitration  must 
cease. 


13 


tional  Justice  through  the  medium  of  the  Council.  The  opinion 
of  the  Court  shall  be  binding  upon  the  arbitrators,  who,  if  the 
opinion  is  affirmative,  shall  confine  themselves  to  so  declaring  in 
their  award. 

If  the  question  is  held  by  the  Court  or  by  the  Council  to  be  a 
matter  solely  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  the  State,  this 
decision  shall  not  prevent  consideration  of  the  situation  by  the 
Council  or  by  the  Assembly  under  Article  11  of  the  Covenant. 


Article  6. 

If  in  accordance  with  paragraph  9 of  Article  15  of  the  Cove- 
nant a dispute  is  referred  to  the  Assembly,  that  body  shall  have 
for  the  settlement  of  the  dispute  all  the  powers  conferred  upon 


14 


Comment  on  Article  5,  par.  3. 

This  is  the  so-called  Japanese  amendment.  When  a 
dispute  is  found  to  relate  to  a domestic  matter,  neither  the 
arbitrators  nor  the  Council  can  thereafter  recommend  a 
binding  solution,  but  as  a condition  precedent  to  a state’s  being 
called  an  aggressor,  the  Council  may  “consider  the  situation.’’ 
This  means  that  the  Council  may  discuss  the  international  sit- 
uation created  by  the  dispute  in  the  hope  of  averting  hostilities 
and  persuading  the  parties  to  avoid  going  to  war.  This 
power  had  already  been  conferred  on  the  Council  by  Article 
11  of  the  Covenant,  which  reads  as  follows: 

“Any  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether  immediately 
affecting  any  of  the  Members  of  the  League  or  not,  is 
hereby  declared  a matter  of  concern  to  the  whole  Leagpae, 
and  the  League  shall  take  any  action  that  may  be  deemed 
wise  and  effectual  to  safeguard  the  peace  of  nations.  In 
case  any  such  emergency  should  arise,  the  Secretary- 
General  shall,  on  the  request  of  any  Member  of  the 
League,  forthwith  summon  a meeting  of  the  Council. 

It  is  also  declared  to  be  the  friendly  right  of  each 
Member  of  the  League  to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the 
Assembly  or  of  the  Council  any  circumstance  whatever 
affecting  international  relations  which  threatens  to  dis- 
turb international  peace  or  the  good  understanding  be- 
tween nations  upon  which  peace  depends.’’ 


Comment  on  Article  6,  of 


The  Covenant  provides  in  Article  15,  par.  9,  that: 

“The  Council  may  in  any  case  under  this  Article 
refer  the  dispute  to  the  Assembly.  The  dispute  shall  be 


IS 


the  Council  as  to  endeavoring  to  reconcile  the  parties  in  the  man- 
ner laid  down  in  paragraphs  1,  2 and  3 of  Article  15  of  the  Cove- 
nant and  in  paragraph  1 of  Article  4 above. 

Should  the  Assembly  fail  to  achieve  an  amicable  settlement; 

If  one  of  the  parties  asks  for  arbitration,  the  Council  shall 
proceed  to  constitute  the  Committee  of  Arbitrators  in  the  manner 
provided  in  sub-paragraphs  (a),  (b)  and  (c)  of  paragraph  2 of 
Article  4 above. 

If  no  party  asks  for  arbitration,  the  Assembly  shall  again 
take  the  dispute  under  consideration  and  shall  have  in  this  con- 
nection the  same  powers  as  the  Council.  Recommendations  em- 
bodied in  a report  of  the  Assembly,  provided  that  it  secures  the 
measure  of  support  stipulated  at  the  end  of  paragraph  10  of  Ar- 
ticle 15  of  the  Covenant,  shall  have  the  same  value  and  effect,  as 
regards  all  matters  dealt  with  in  the  present  Protocol,  as  recom- 
mendations embodied  in  a report  of  the  Council  adopted  as  pro- 
vided in  paragraph  3 of  Article  4 above. 

If  the  necessary  majority  cannot  be  obtained,  the  dispute  shall 
be  submitted  to  arbitration  and  the  Council  shall  determine  the 
composition,  the  powers  and  the  procedure  of  the  Committee  of 
A.rbitrators  as  laid  down  in  paragraph  4 of  Article  4. 

Article  7. 

In  the  event  of  a dispute  arising  between  two  or  more  sig- 
natory States,  these  States  agree  that  they  will  not,  either  before 
the  dispute  is  submitted  to  proceedings  for  pacific  settlement  or 
during  such  proceedings,  make  any  increase  of  their  armaments  or 
effectives  which  might  modify  the  position  established  by  the  Con- 
ference for  the  Reduction  of  Armaments  provided  for  by  Article 
17  of  the  present  Protocol,  nor  will  they  take  any  measure  of  mil- 
itary, naval,  air,  industrial  or  economic  mobilization,  nor,  in  gen- 
eral, any  action  of  a nature  likely  to  extend  the  dispute  or  render 
it  more  acute. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Council,  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions  of  Article  11  of  the  Covenant,  to  take  under  consider- 


16 


so  referred  at  the  request  of  either  party  to  the  dispute, 
provided  that  such  request  be  made  within  14  days  after 
the  submission  of  the  dispute  to  the  Council.” 

Article  6 of  the  Protocol  simply  applies  to  this  event  the 
procedure  already  provided  for,  if  the  dispute  had  remained 
before  the  Council. 


Comment  on  Article  7,  par.  1. 

This  is  an  undertaking  on  the  part  of  states  not  to  pre- 
cipitate hostilities  in  the  event  of  a dispute. 


Comment  on  Article  7,  par.  2. 

The  Council  is  given  power  to  consider  any  complaint 
17 


ation  any  complaint  as  to  infraction  of  the  above  undertakings 
which  is  made  to  it  by  one  or  more  of  the  States  parties  to  the 
dispute.  Should  the  Council  be  of  opinion  that  the  complaint  re- 
quires investigation,  it  shall,  if  it  deems  it  expedient,  arrange  for 
enquiries  and  investigations  in  one  or  more  of  the  countries  con- 
cerned. Such  enquiries  and  investigations  shall  be  carried  out 
with  the  utmost  possible  despatch  and  the  signatory  States  under- 
take to  aflford  every  facility  for  carrying  them  out. 

The  sole  object  of  measures  taken  by  the  Council  as  above 
provided  is  to  facilitate  the  pacific  settlement  of  disputes  and  they 
shall  in  no  way  prejudge  the  actual  settlement. 


If  the  result  of  such  enquiries  and  investigations  is  to  estab- 
lish an  infraction  of  the  provisions  of  the  first  paragraph  of  the 
present  Article,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Council  to  summon  the 
State  or  States  guilty  of  the  infraction  to  put  an  end  thereto. 
Should  the  State  or  States  in  question  fail  to  comply  with  such 
summons,  the  Council  shall  declare  them  to  be  guilty  of  a viola- 
tion of  the  Covenant  or  of  the  present  Protocol,  and  shall  decide 
upon  the  measures  to  be  taken  with  a view  to  end  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble a situation  of  a nature  to  threaten  the  peace  of  the  world. 

For  the  purposes  of  the  present  Article  decisions  of  the 
Council  may  be  taken  by  a two-thirds  majority. 


Article  8. 

The  signatory  States  undertake  to  abstain  from  any  act  which 
might  constitute  a threat  of  aggression  against  another  State. 

If  one  of  the  signatory  States  is  of  opinion  that  another  State 
is  making  preparations  for  war,  it  shall  have  the  right  to  bring 
the  matter  to  the  notice  of  the  Council. 

The  Council,  if  it  ascertains  that  the  facts  are  as  alleged,  shall 
proceed  as  provided  in  paragraphs  2,  4,  and  5 of  Article  7. 


18 


that  a state  is  about  to  precipitate  hostilities  in  the  event  of 
a dispute.  In  dealing  with  this  complaint  the  Council  may 
arrange  to  conduct  an  investigation,  such  investigation  to  be 
limited  to  the  question  of  compdiance  with  the  procedure  for 
peaceful  settlement. 


Comment  on  Article  7,  par.  4. 

If  the  Council  should  find  that  a state  has  taken  precipi- 
tate action,  it  will  call  upon  the  state  to  put  an  end  thereto, 
and  if  that  state  refuses,  the  Council  will  declare  it  a law- 
breaker. 


Comment  on  Article  7,  par.  5. 

In  all  of  this  the  Council  will  act  by  2/3  majority. 


Comment  on  Article  8. 

The  signatory  states  agree  to  refrain  from  threats  of 
aggression  and  from  preparations  for  war.  The  Council  will 
consider  any  complaint  on  this  basis  and  conduct  an  in- 
vestigation. 


19 


Article  9. 

The  existence  of  demilitarized  zones  being  calculated  to  pre- 
vent aggression  and  to  facilitate  a definite  finding  of  the  nature 
provided  for  in  Article  10  below,  the  establishment  of  such  zones 
between  States  mutually  consenting  thereto  is  recommended  as  a 
means  of  avoiding  violations  of  the  present  Protocol. 

The  demilitarized  zones  already  existing  under  the  terms  of 
certain  treaties  or  conventions,  or  which  may  be  established  in 
future  between  States  mutually  consenting  thereto,  may  at  the 
request  and  at  the  expense  of  one  or  more  of  the  conterminous 
States,  be  placed  under  a temporary  or  permanent  system  of  su- 
pervision to  be  organized  by  the  Council. 

Article  10. 

Every  State  which  resorts  to  war  in  violation  of  the  under- 
takings contained  in  the  Covenant  or  in  the  present  Protocol  is 
an  aggressor.  Violation  of  the  rules  laid  down  for  a demilitarized 
zone  shall  be  held  equivalent  to  resort  to  war. 

In  the  event  of  hostilities  having  broken  out,  any  State  shall  ’ 
be  presumed  to  be  an  aggressor,  unless  a decision  of  the  Council, 
which  must  be  taken  unanimously,  shall  otherwise  declare : 


1.  If  it  has  refused  to  submit  the  dispute  to  the  procedure 
of  pacific  settlement  provided  by  Articles  13  and  15  of 
the  Covenant  as  amplified  by  the  present  Protocol,  or  to 
comply  with  a judicial  sentence  or  arbitral  award  or  with 
a unanimous  recommendation  of  the  Council,  or  has  dis- 
regarded a unanimous  report  of  the  Council,  a judicial 
sentence  or  an  arbitral  award  recognizing  that  the  dispute 
between  it  and  the  other  belligerent  State  arises  out  of  a 
matter  which  by  international  law  is  solely  within  the 
domestic  jurisdiction  of  the  latter  State;  nevertheless,  in 
the  last  case  the  State  shall  only  be  presumed  to  be  an 
aggressor  if  it  has  not  previously  submitted  the  question 


20 


Comment  on  Article  9. 

This  is  a recommendation  that  demilitarized  zones  be 
established  by  states  desiring  to  establish  them.  Where  such 
zones  exist,  they  may  be  placed  under  a system  of  supervi- 
sion to  be  organized  by  the  Council.  Norway  and  Sweden 
established  such  zones  by  treaty  in  1905,  and  Russia  and 
Finland  have  recently  taken  similar  action. 


Comment  on  Article  10,  unnumbered  par.  1. 

This  is  the  definition  of  “aggressor.”  It  follows  the  prin- 
cipal idea  of  the  Bliss-Miller-Shotwell  (the  so-called  Amer- 
ican) plan. 


Comment  on  Article  10,  unnumbered  par.  2. 

If  a war  breaks  out,  a state  will  be  presumed  to  be  an 
aggressor,  unless  the  Council  unanimously  decides  otherwise 
in  the  enumerated  cases. 

Comment  on  Article  10,  numbered  par.  1. 

The  refusal  to  submit  to  the  procedure  outlined  or  to 
comply  with  a judgment  of  the  International  Court  or  an 
arbitral  award  or  a unanimous  recommendation  of  the  Council 
is  an  aggression.  If,  however,  a matter  has  been  judged  to 
be  domestic,  a state  is  an  aggressor  in  undertaking  hostilities 
only  when  the  matter  has  not  been  previously  submitted  to 
the  Council  or  Assembly  for  “consideration  of  the  situation.” 


21 


to  the  Council  or  the  Assembly,  in  accordance  with  Article 
11  of  the  Covenant. 

2.  If  it  has  violated  provisional  measures  enjoined  by  the 
Council  for  the  period  while  the  proceedings  are  in  prog- 
ress as  contemplated  by  Article  7 of  the  present  Protocol. 

Apart  from  the  cases  dealt  with  in  paragraphs  1 and  2 of  the 
present  Article,  if  the  Council  does  not  at  once  succeed  in  deter- 
mining the  aggressor,  it  shall  be  bound  to  enjoin  upon  the  bel- 
ligerents an  armistice,  and  shall  fix  the  terms,  acting,  if  need  be, 
by  a two-thirds  majority  and  shall  supervise  its  execution. 

Any  belligerent  which  has  refused  to  accept  the  armistice  or 
has  violated  its  terms  shall  be  deemed  an  aggressor. 


The  Council  shall  call  upon  the  signatory  States  to  apply 
forthwith  against  the  aggressor  the  sanctions  provided  by  Article 
11  of  the  present  Protocol,  and  any  signatory  State  thus  called 
upon  shall  thereupon  be  entitled  to  exercise  the  rights  of  a 
belligerent. 

Article  11. 

As  soon  as  the  Council  has  called  upon  the  signatory  States 
to  apply  sanctions,  as  provided  in  the  last  paragraph  of  Article  10 
of  the  present  Protocol,  the  obligations  of  the  said  States,  in  re- 
gard to  the  sanctions  of  all  kinds  mentioned  in  paragraphs  1 and 
2 of  Article  16  of  the  Covenant,  will  immediately  become  opera- 
tive in  order  that  such  sanctions  may  forthwith  be  employed 
against  the  aggressor. 

Those  obligations  shall  be  interpreted  as  obliging  each  of  the 
signatory  States  to  cooperate  loyally  and  effectively  in  support  of 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  and  in  resistance  to  any 
act  of  aggression,  in  the  degree  which  its  geographical  position  and 
its  particular  situation  as  regards  armaments  allow. 


22 


Comment  on  Article  10,  numbered  par.  2. 

Refusal  to  comply  with  the  Council’s  suggestions  for 
preventing  precipitate  hostilities  will  constitute  a state  an 
aggressor. 

Comment  on  Article  10,  unnumbered  par.  3. 

If  the  Council  cannot  say  who  is  aggressor,  it  will  order 
an  armistice  fixing  the  terms  and  supervising  the  execution. 


Comment  on  Article  10,  unnumbered  par.  4. 

If  a state  refuses  to  accept  this  armistice,  it  will  be  an 
aggressor. 

Comment  on  Article  10,  unnumbered  par.  5. 

Once  a state  is  found  to  be  an  aggressor,  the  Council  will 
call  upon  all  signatory  states  to  exercise  sanctions  against  it. 
Any  state  thus  called  upon  will  be  entitled  to  become  a 
belligerent,  but  will  not  be  bound  to  become  a belligerent. 

Comment  on  Article  11. 

This  article  provides  for  the  application  of  all  the  sanc- 
tions already  stipulated  in  Article  16  of  the  Covenant.  These 
sanctions  provided  for  in  Article  16  of  the  Covenant  are  of 
various  kinds ; economic,  financial,  military.  In  the  case  of 
the  military  forces  to  be  contributed,  the  Council  may  only 
recommend,  it  cannot  decide,  the  contribution  of  each  state. 
The  states  are  bound  to  afford  passage  to  the  troops  engaged 
in  protecting  the  covenants  of  the  League. 

Comment  on  Article  11,  par.  2. 

The  precise  nature  of  the  cooperation  is  not  prescribed. 
Here  is  special  recognition  of  differences  in  geographical 
position. 


23 


In  accordance  with  paragraph  3 of  Article  16  of  the  Cove- 
nant the  signatory  States  give  a joint  and  several  undertaking  to 
come  to  the  assistance  of  the  State  attacked  or  threatened,  and  to 
give  each  other  mutual  support  by  means  of  facilities  and  recipro- 
cal exchanges  as  regards  the  provision  of  raw  materials  and  sup- 
plies of  every  kind,  openings  of  credits,  transport  and  transit,  and 
for  this  purpose  to  take  all  measures  in  their  power  to  preserve 
the  safety  of  communications  by  land  and  by  sea  of  the  attacked 
or  threatened  State. 

If  both  parties  to  the  dispute  are  aggressors  within  the  mean- 
ing of  Article  10,  the  economic  and  financial  sanctions  shall  be 
applied  to  both  of  them. 


Article  12. 

In  view  of  the  complexity  of  the  conditions  in  which  the 
Council  may  be  called  upon  to  exercise  the  functions  mentioned 
in  Article  11  of  the  present  Protocol  concerning  economic  and 
financial  sanctions,  and  in  order  to  determine  more  exactly  the 
guarantees  afforded  by  the  present  Protocol  to  the  signatory 
States,  the  Council  shall  forthwith  invite  the  economic  and  finan- 
cial organizations  of  the  League  of  Nations  to  consider  and  report 
as  to  the  nature  of  the  steps  to  be  taken  to  give  effect  to  the  finan- 
cial and  economic  sanctions  and  measures  of  cooperation  contem- 
plated in  Article  16  of  the  Covenant  and  in  Article  11  of  this 
Protocol. 

When  in  possession  of  this  information,  the  Council  shall 
draw  up  through  its  competent  organs  : 

1.  Plans  of  action  for  the  application  of  the  economic  and 
financial  sanctions  against  an  aggressor  State; 

2.  Plans  of  economic  and  financial  cooperation  between  a 
State  attacked  and  the  different  States  assisting  it; 

and  shall  communicate  these  plans  to  the  Members  of  the  League 
and  to  the  other  signatory  States. 


24 


Comment  on  Article  11,  par.  3. 

Each  signatory  agrees  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  a 
victim  of  aggression.  But  except  for  the  precision  of  this 
article,  each  state  will  determine  for  itself  the  nature  of  the 
assistance  it  will  render.  Likewise,  each  state  will  determine 
for  itself  the  measures  in  its  power  to  be  taken  to  keep  com- 
munications open. 


Comment  on  Article  11,  par.  4. 

Two  states  engaged  in  a war  may  both  be  aggressors — 
they  would  then  be  engaged  in  an  illegal  international  brawl. 

Comment  on  Article  12. 

Provision  is  made  for  defining  and  specifying  the 
measures  to  be  taken  in  order  to  give  effect  to  the  economic 
and  financial  sanctions  laid  down  in  Article  16  of  the  Cove-“ 
nant.  Definite  plans  are  to  be  drawn  up  by  the  Council  on 
the  basis  of  information  supplied  by  the  economic  and 
financial  organizations  of  the  League.  When  these  plans 
have  been  communicated  to  the  signatories,  it  will  then  be 
for  each  signatory  to  say  for  itself  whether  and  how  it 
will  execute  these  plans. 


25 


Article  13. 

In  view  of  the  contingent  military,  naval  and  air  sanctions 
provided  for  by  Article  16  of  the  Covenant  and  by  Article  11  of 
the  present  Protocol,  the  Council  shall  be  entitled  to  receive  under- 
takings from  States  determining  in  advance  the  military,  naval 
and  air  forces  which  they  would  be  able  to  bring  into  action  im- 
mediately to  ensure  the  fulfilment  of  the  obligations  in  regard  to 
sanctions  which  result  from  the  Covenant  and  the  present 
Protocol. 


Furthermore,  as  soon  as  the  Council  has  called  upon  the  sig- 
natory States  to  apply  sanctions,  as  provided  in  the  last  paragraph 
of  Article  10  above,  the  said  States  may,  in  accordance  with  any 
agreements  which  they  may  previously  have  concluded,  bring  to  the 
assistance  of  a particular  State,  which  is  the  victim  of  aggression, 
their  military,  naval  and  air  forces. 

The  agreements  mentioned  in  the  preceding  paragraph  shall 
be  registered  and  published  by  the  Secretariat  of  the  League  of 
Nations.  They  shall  remain  open  to  all  States  Members  of  the 
League  which  may  desire  to  accede  thereto. 


26 


Comment  on  Article  13,  par.  1. 

The  provision  in  Article  16  about  use  of  military  forces 
is  here  recognized  to  be  “contingent.”  That  is,  the  Council 
can  only  recommend  use  of  such  forces  to  protect  the  League 
covenants.  Each  state  decides  for  itself  whether  and  to  what 
extent  its  forces  will  be  used.  No  state  is  willing  to  give  up 
its  control  of  its  own  army  and  navy. 

Under  this  article  of  the  Protocol,  states  may  give  to  the 
Council,  and  the  Council  may  receive,  undertakings  from 
various  states  to  use  their  forces  in  aid  of  the  obligations  of 
the  Covenant  and  the  Protocol.  No  state  is  bound  to  gpve 
such  an  undertaking.  The  English  text  is  made  clearer  by 
the  Erench  text  which  literally  translated  says  that  the 
Council  shall  have  capacity  to  receive — “aura  qualite  p>our 
recevoir”- — such  undertakings.  These  undertakings  are  to  be 
preferred  to  particular  treaties,  for  they  seem  less  like 
alliances. 


Comment  on  Article  13,  par.  2. 

This  is  a recognition  that  states  may  enter  into  special 
treaties  to  protect  one  another. 


Comment  on  Article  13,  par.  3. 

But  such  treaties  must  be  registered  under  Article  18 
of  the  Covenant.  This  may  prevent  another  such  discus- 
sion as  that  of  1920  about  the  registration  of  the  Eranco- 
Belgian  military  convention.  Moreover,  every  such  treaty 
must  be  open  in  the  sense  that  other  members  of  the  League 
may  accede  to  it.  Thus  if  Erance  and  England  agree  to 
protect  each  other  in  case  of  attack,  Belgium  will  be  entitled 
to  make  it  a three-cornered  arrangement  if  she  desires.  Ger- 
many would  have  the  same  privilege  if  she  should  join  the 
League.  This  is  a very  big  innovation. 

27 


Article  14, 

The  Council  shall  alone  be  competent  to  declare  that  the  ap- 
plication of  sanctions  shall  cease  and  normal  conditions  be  re- 
established. 


Article  15. 

In  conformity  with  the  spirit  of  the  present  Protocol,  the 
signatory  States  agree  that  the  whole  cost  of  any  military,  naval 
or  air  operations  undertaken  for  the  repression  of  an  aggression 
under  the  terms  of  the  Protocol,  and  reparation  for  all  losses  suf- 
fered by  individuals,  whether  civilians  or  combatants,  and  for  all 
material  damage  caused  by  the  operations  of  both  sides,  shall  be 
borne  by  the  aggressor  State  up  to  the  extreme  limit  of  its  ca- 
pacity. 

Nevertheless,  in  view  of  Article  10  of  the  Covenant,  neither 
the  territorial  integrity  nor  the  political  independence  of  the  ag- 
gressor State  shall  in  any  case  be  affected  as  the  result  of  the 
application  of  the  sanctions  mentioned  in  the  present  Protocol. 


Article  16. 

The  signatory  States  agree  that  in  the  event  of  a dispute  be- 
tween one  or  more  of  them  and  one  or  more  States  which  have 
not  signed  the  present  Protocol  and  are  not  Members  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  such  non-Member  States  shall  be  invited,  on 
the  conditions  contemplated  in  Article  17  of  the  Covenant,  to  sub- 
mit, for  the  purpose  of  a pacific  settlement,  to  the  obligations  ac- 
cepted by  the  States  signatories  of  the  present  Protocol. 

If  the  State  so  invited,  having  refused  to  accept  the  said  con- 
ditions and  obligations,  resorts  to  war  against  a signatory  State, 
the  provisions  of  Article  16  of  the  Covenant,  as  defined  by  the 
present  Protocol,  shall  be  applicable  against  it. 

28 


Comment  on  Article  14. 

As  it  is  the  Council  which  calls  upon  the  sig'natories  to 
apply  the  sanction,  (Art.  10),  so  it  is  also  the  Council  which 
decides  when  the  application  of  the  sanctions  is  to  cease. 


Comment  on  Article  15. 

The  idea  that  the  aggressor  must  pay  the  cost  was  in- 
cluded in  the  Shotwell  draft.  This  is  a severe  penalty.  It 
may  have  a dissuasive  effect.  The  penalty  can  never  be 
exacted  to  the  point  of  depriving  a state  of  independence  or 
territory. 


Comment  on  Article  16. 

Under  this  article,  states  not  signatory  to  the  Protocol 
and  not  members  of  the  League  are  invited  to  accept  the 
obligation  of  the  Protocol  in  case  of  a dispute  with  a signa- 
tory and  member.  This  is  co-extensive  with  Article  17  of 
the  Covenant,  and  hence  involves  no  new  idea. 


29 


Article  17. 

The  signatory  States  undertake  to  participate  in  an  Interna- 
tional Conference  for  the  Reduction  of  Armaments  which  shall 
be  convened  by  the  Council  and  shall  meet  at  Geneva  on  Monday, 
June  15th,  1925.  All  other  States,  whether  Members  of  the 
League  or  not,  shall  be  invited  to  this  Conference. 

In  preparation  for  the  convening  of  the  Conference,  the 
Council  shall  draw  up  with  due  regard  to  the  undertakings  con- 
tained in  Articles  11  and  13  of  the  present  Protocol  a general 
programme  for  the  reduction  and  limitation  of  armaments,  which 
shall  be  laid  before  the  Conference  and  which  shall  be  communi- 
cated to  the  Governments  at  the  earliest  possible  date,  and  at  the 
latest  three  months  before  the  Conference  meets. 

If  by  May  1st,  1925,  ratifications  have  not  been  deposited  by 
at  least  a majority  of  the  permanent  Members  of  the  Council  and 
ten  other  Members  of  the  League,  the  Secretary-General  of  the 
League  shall  immediately  consult  the  Council  as  to  whether  he 
shall  cancel  the  invitation  or  merely  adjourn  the  Conference  to 
a subsequent  date  to  be  fixed  by  the  Council  so  as  to  permit  the 
necessary  number  of  ratifications  to  be  obtained. 


Article  18. 

Wherever  mention  is  made  in  Article  10,  or  in  any  other 
provision  of  the  present  Protocol,  of  a decision  of  the  Council, 
this  shall  be  understood  in  the  sense  of  Article  15  of  the  Cove- 
nant, namely  that  the  votes  of  the  representatives  of  the  parties 
to  the  dispute  shall  not  be  counted  when  reckoning  unanimity  or'*' 
the  necessary  majority. 


30 


Gomment  on  Article  17. 

The  conference  for  the  reduction  of  armaments  here 
provided  for  depends  on  the  Protocol,  as  the  Protocol  de- 
pends on  the  conference.  (Art.  21).  Unless  three  of  the 
four  permanent  members  of  the  Council — France,  Great 
Britain,  Italy,  Japan — and  ten  other  members  of  the  League 
have  ratified  the  Protocol  by  May  1,  1925,  the  conference 
may  either  be  postponed  or  canceled  altogether. 

All  states,  members  and  non-members  of  the  League, 
are  to  be  invited  to  the  conference,  including  Germany, 
Russia  and  the  United  States.  They  will  consider  a definite 
program  for  reduction  and  limitation  of  armaments  drawn 
up  by  the  Council.  In  this  work  the  Council  will  have  the 
assistance  of  (1)  the  recently  reorganized  Temporary  Com- 
mission on  Reduction  of  Armaments,  now  called  to  meet  on 
November  17,  1924;  (2)  the  Permanent  Advisory  Com- 
mission on  Military,  Naval  and  Air  Questions;  and  (3)  the 
Disarmament  Section  of  the  League  Secretariat,  which  in- 
cludes many  experts.  Preparatory  work  has  already  begun. 
On  the  day  after  the  Protocol  was  approved,  the  Council 
met  and  took  preliminary  decisions. 

Geneva  was  the  natural  choice  for  the  meeting  place. 
It  is  ridiculous  to  suppose  that  there  was  any  hostility  to 
Washington  or  to  the  United  States  in  selecting  it.  Geneva 
is  the  only  city  in  the  world  where  the  necessary  machinery 
now  exists  to  prepare  and  to  conduct  the  Conference.  Forty- 
eight  states,  in  the  habit  of  meeting  there  every  year,  natu- 
rally preferred  it. 

Gomment  on  Article  18. 

This  article  merely  extends  the  provision  of  the  Cove- 
nant that  in  case  of  a dispute,  the  decision  of  the  Council  is 
regarded  as  unanimous  if  it  includes  all  the  votes  except  those 
of  the  parties  to  the  dispute.  The  parties  to  a dispute,  even 
though  not  members  of  the  Council,  become  members  of  the 
Council  ad  hoc  when  the  dispute  is  submitted  to  the  Council. 


31 


Article  19. 

Except  as  expressly  provided  by  its  terms,  the  present  Pro- 
tocol shall  not  affect  in  any  way  the  rights  and  obligations  of 
Members  of  the  League  as  determined  by  the  Covenant. 

Article  20, 

Any  dispute  as  to  the  interpretation  of  the  present  Protocol 
shall  be  submitted  to  the  Permanent  Court  of  International 
Justice. 


Article  21. 

The  present  Protocol,  of  which  the  French  and  English  texts 
are  both  authentic,  shall  be  ratified. 

The  deposit  of  ratifications  shall  be  made  at  the  Secretariat  of 
the  League  of  Nations  as  soon  as  possible. 

States  of  which  the  seat  of  government  is  outside  Europe  will 
be  entitled  merely  to  inform  the  Secretariat  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions that  their  ratification  has  been  given;  in  that  case,  they 
must  transmit  the  instrument  of  ratification  as  soon  as  possible. 

So  soon  as  the  majority  of  the  permanent  Members  of  the 
Council  and  ten  other  Members  of  the  League  have  deposited  or 
have  effected  their  ratifications,  a proch-verbal  to  that  effect  shall 
be  drawn  up  by  the  Secretariat. 

After  the  said  proces-verbal  has  been  drawn  up,  the  Protocol 
shall  come  into  force  as  soon  as  the  plan  for  the  reduction  of 
armaments  has  been  adopted  by  the  Conference  provided  for  in 
Article  17. 


32 


In  this  way  they  are  sure  of  participating  on  a basis  of  equal- 
ity in  the  proceedings ; but  if  the  votes  of  the  disputants 
were  counted  in  the  decisions,  this  would  make  them  judges 
in  their  own  case. 

Comment  on  Article  19. 

The  Protocol  does  not  supersede  the  Covenant,  nor  re- 
lease the  members  of  the  League  from  any  of  its  obligations. 


Comment  on  Article  20. 

This  article,  which  gives  to  the  Permanent  Court  of 
International  Justice  compulsory  jurisdiction  over  all  dis- 
putes as  to  interpretation  of  the  Protocol,  corresponds  to 
similar  provisions  in  numerous  treaties  and  protocols  drawn 
up  since  the  Court  came  into  existence. 


Comment  on  Article  21. 

In  addition  to  the  usual  provisions  for  ratification,  this 
article  contains  the  provision  making  the  coming  into  force 
of  the  Protocol  dependent  on  the  adoption  of  the  plan  for 
the  reduction  of  armaments  by  the  conference  (Art.  17), 
and  on  the  carrying  out  of  this  plan.  In  this  way  the  inter- 
dependence of  disarmament,  security  and  arbitration  is  again 
emphasized. 


33 


If  within  such  period  after  the  adoption  of  the  plan  for  the 
reduction  of  armaments  as  shall  be  fixed  by  the  said  Conference, 
the  plan  has  not  been  carried  out,  the  Council  shall  make  a declara- 
tion to  that  effect ; this  declaration  shall  render  the  present  Proto- 
col null  and  void. 

The  grounds  on  which  the  Council  may  declare  that  the  plan 
drawn  up  by  the  International  Conference  for  the  Reduction  of 
Armaments  has  not  been  carried  out,  and  that  in  consequence  the 
present  Protocol  has  been  rendered  null  and  void,  shall  be  laid 
down  by  the  Conference  itself. 

A signatory  State  which,  after  the  expiration  of  the  period 
fixed  by  the  Conference,  fails  to  comply  with  the  plan  adopted  by 
the  Conference,  shall  not  be  admitted  to  benefit  by  the  provisions 
of  the  present  Protocol. 

In  faith  whereof  the  Undersigned,  duly  authorized  for  this 
purpose,  have  signed  the  present  Protocol. 

Done  at  Geneva,  on  the  day  of  October,  nineteen 

hundred  and  twenty-four,  in  a single  copy,  which  will  be  kept  in 
the  archives  of  the  Secretariat  of  the  League  and  registered  by  it 
on  the  date  of  its  coming  into  force. 


34 


The  Protocol  has  now  been  signed  by  eleven  states  as 
follows:  Albania,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia, 

Esthonia,  France,  Greece,  Latvia.  Poland,  Portugal,  Serb- 
Croat-SIovene  State.  It  is  open  to  signature  by  forty-four 
more  members  of  the  League.  The  United  States  is  not 
invited  to  sign.  After  signature,  a state  must  ratify.  When 
three  of  the  four  Powers — British  Empire,  France,  Italy  and 
Japan — and  ten  other  members  of  the  League  have  deposited 
their  ratifications  with  the  Secretariat  at  Geneva,  a proces- 
verbal  will  be  drawn  up.  But  the  Protocol  will  not  come  into 
force  finally  until  the  plan  for  the  reduction  of  armaments 
has  been  adopted  by  the  conference  (Art.  17).  If  the  Coun- 
cil finds,  in  accordance  with  criteria  laid  down  by  the  con- 
ference, that  the  plan  for  the  reduction  of  armaments  has 
not  been  carried  out,  a declaration  to  that  effect  renders  the 
Protocol  null  and  void.  Even  though  the  plan  and  conse- 
quently the  Protocol  are  both  operative,  no  single  state  failing 
to  comply  with  the  plan  can  benefit  by  the  provisions  of  the 
Protocol.  ^ 


35 


